The three candidates still standing seem to have ‘contain China’ at the top of their to-do lists for this region Since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, American prestige in the world has declined as has overall goodwill towards the United States. US policy in Asia was perceived through the paradigmatic prism of the “global war on terror”, thus providing opportunities for China to use its soft power to gain influence in the region as America’s attention was diverted.

The reasonable assumption that many observers make is that whoever gets elected to the White House in November this year, we will witness significant change in US foreign policy. It is worth assessing what impact Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama or John McCain might have generally on US policy, and then specifically on US policy in Asia.

First, it should be noted that foreign policy is usually not the most salient issue in elections, and, despite the fact that Americans are at war in Afghanistan and Iraq, this one is no different.

In 1991, George H.W. Bush won a popular war against Saddam Hussein and yet failed to get re-elected to a second presidential term, but his son, George W. Bush, won re-election in the midst of an unpopular war.

The main issues in elections tend to relate to immediate and pressing issues in the economy: interest rates, jobs, housing, health, and education. With the US perhaps heading for recession, polls clearly show that for most voters economic issues are paramount.

The second point is that although individuals can make a difference to policy, they do so only in accordance with the possibilities and constraints of the objective circumstances pertaining at any particular time.

There are some indicators what foreign policy would be like under each of the three chief contenders. Mr McCain is the strongest pro-war candidate, having supported both authorisation for the Iraq war in 2003 and pushing for the surge in 2007, stating as president he would keep US forces in Iraq until final victory, even if this takes 100 years.

Mr McCain has also taken the most bellicose stance of the three candidates in relation to Iran. Some prominent foreign policy neo-conservatives are supporting Mr McCain’s current campaign, as they did his previous bid for the Republican nomination against the first Mr Bush, giving some indication of Mr McCain’s greater willingness to continue part of the neo-conservative foreign policy agenda.

Mr McCain spent some five years in Southeast Asia, locked up in prison camps after his aircraft was shot down over Hanoi in 1967, hence he does have direct experience in the region. Indeed, during the election campaign he is the only candidate who has made frequent references to countries in Southeast Asia, supporting, for example, free-trade agreements with Thailand and Malaysia.

He would put pressure on Burma to end its “deplorable human rights abuses”, expand defence cooperation with Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam, and play a more active role in Asian regional organisations, including those led by Asean. He would seek to institutionalise the new quadrilateral security partnership among the major Asia-Pacific democracies of Australia, India, Japan and the US.

Mr McCain sees China as a central challenge to US interests, listing its military build-up, threats to Taiwan, trade and currency policies, economic ties with Burma, Sudan and Zimbabwe, and its advocacy of regional forums in Asia that would isolate the US.

Central to Mr McCain’s vision for the future of US grand strategy is his conception of a League of Democracies, in which democratic states from different continents will unite on the basis of common values. It is envisaged that the league could be used for military intervention, where the UN fails to act against threats to security. Mr McCain’s foreign policy would be more assertive than either Mr Obama’s or Mrs Clinton’s in fostering democracy in places such as Burma, Cuba and the Arab world, in countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in countries such as Iran and in pursuing the “war on terror” in Iraq.

In foreign policy, Mr McCain offers the least radical departure from the Bush years, but with a much greater focus on reasserting US interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

Mr Obama’s biography is fascinating, his rhetoric and speeches inspiring, his relative youth appealing and his idealistic call for change mobilising a new generation of voters - but none of this provides a clear idea of what foreign policies he would pursue. It is true that he opposed the war in Iraq from the outset, and that he predicted the chaos that would ensue. To many this gives some confidence that Mr Obama would not take unilateral military action where there were no clear and present dangers facing the US national interest. To others, however, his suggestion that US forces should be used against terrorists in Pakistan shows a certain naivety. Yet Mr Obama sees Pakistan as the front line in the war against al-Qaeda.

Certainly expectations would be raised of a radical departure from previous policies if Mr Obama were to win the election. As far as what one can glean from his previous behaviour, policies, speeches, writings and declarations, Mr Obama does indeed appear to offer the most significant potential foreign policy change of any of the three candidates. Mr Obama is more strongly committed to multilateralism, and an active diplomacy that would provide an opportunity to engage with competitors and adversaries, in an attempt to resolve problems before they reach the point of violent conflict. Mr Obama would be willing to talk to the leaders of Iran, Syria, Cuba and Venezuela.

For Mr Obama, the most urgent threat facing the US is of WMD falling into the hands of global terrorists and rogue states. Weak states offer a sanctuary and breeding ground for disease, terrorism and conflict. Mr Obama argues that the US has direct national security interests in reducing poverty and helping to rebuild failing states. He also talks of rising powers that could challenge the US and undermine the foundations of liberal democracy. Yet he does not advocate pursuing adversarial relationships with these powers but rather cooperation: with Russia, to deal with securing WMD and to scale back outdated Cold War nuclear postures; and with China, to deal with regional security in East Asia.

Overall, however, Mr Obama’s focus appears not to be the great powers, China, or the Asia-Pacific region. It is Iraq, Iran, the Middle East, terrorism, WMD proliferation, global warming, failed states and energy security.

Mrs Clinton’s foreign policy orientation is not fundamentally different from Mr Obama’s. She too stresses the need to fight global terrorists, stabilise Afghanistan, prevent WMD proliferation, support Israel, energy security and the importance of the Middle East.

Mrs Clinton talks of a need to get US troops out of Iraq, but will not lock herself into a timetable for withdrawal. She has also proposed a global multi-billion-dollar assistance package to help develop post-war Iraq.

However, she does give a little more attention to the future competition between the US and a resurgent and strong Russia and China. As president. Mrs Clinton would make cooperation with Moscow dependent upon moves towards democracy in Russia and an absence of interference in the Eurasian region.

She states explicitly that the US relationship with China will be the most important bilateral relationship in the world this century.  She talks about cooperating with China, building on the experience in the six-party talks over North Korea to establish a Northeast Asian security regime. However, this is likely to be complicated by the rise of great power competition in central Asia, with India, Russia and China vying for influence. Mrs Clinton also talks about cooperating with China and Japan in developing clean energy resources.

Mrs Clinton has taken a stronger stance against Iran than Mr Obama. She was the only one among the original field of democratic candidates who supported strong sanctions against Iran over the nuclear issue. She also argues that the case for war against Iraq was reasonable at the time she voted for it, given what was then known. Although detested by many on the Republican right, Mrs Clinton is actually the most conservative of the original democratic contenders. She not only voted for the war in Iraq, she voted for every subsequent defence appropriations bill.

In the final analysis, Mr Obama, Mrs Clinton and Mr McCain all prioritise the war against terrorism, perceive fundamentalist Islam as a threat, see the issue of WMD proliferation in Iran as a major concern and fear the increasing anarchy of rogue and failing states. They all also see the Middle East as critical to US national security, linked to a number of key goals: security of Israel, the flow of oil, and the threat of terrorism. All three of them share the same general and specific perceptions of what threatens the US that has been outlined in strategic documents in the US since 9/11, and they all still link democracy promotion with the American national interest.

It is evident that their Asia policy will be largely determined by competition with China, the reassertion of Russian power in Eurasia, the nuclear threat on the Korean peninsula, and maintaining relationships with Japan, India and Pakistan.

Pakistan has become a central focus due to the dangers of al-Qaeda and terrorist groups spreading there, and the porous border it has with Afghanistan, where the US is still in a battle with the Taliban.

It is likely, given the increasing economic and soft power resources of China, and the fact that China has been allowed to use these instruments to quietly gain influence in the region over the past few years, as the US has been preoccupied with Iraq and terrorism, that China will come back to a dominant position in the strategic thinking of the next administration, no matter who sits in the White House.

There will be little disagreement on the fundamental goals; the differences will be over the means of achieving them. But we are likely to see a much great effort in cooperating with allies in multilateral forums no matter who wins in November. A greater engagement with Asia is in the offing whoever wins; but the war on terror, failing states and WMD proliferation will still dominate strategic thinking-notwithstanding the possibility of another strategic shock.

Peter Shearman is director of the American Studies Programme, Institute of Security and International Studies, Chulalongkorn University.

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